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1. Introduction 
The problem of ascertaining tastes for public goods is one of serious practical 
as well as theoretical concern. Recently, attention has been devoted to the design 
of mechanisms to elicit the true tastes of the population and to act in accordance 
with the information revealed [Groves (1973), Groves and Loeb (1975), Kurz 
(1974)]. We shall be concerned with the simplest of such problems -the deter- 
mination of the desire of the population for a single specific public project. 
We require that the procedure be known to all participants, and that the 
government be bound to act in accordance with the announced preferences. 
Groves (1973) has studied one such process which has the following desirable 
properties: it is in every individual’s interest to announce his true preference for 
the project independent of the announcements of others, and the project is 
undertaken whenever the announced value to society exceeds its cost. Such 
procedures we call individually incentive compatible and successful. 
Specifically, it is supposed that individual i’s willingness-to-pay for the project 
is vi and his announced valuation is Wi. Without loss of generality, we take the 
cost of the project to be zero. Costly projects can be treated by subtracting the 
per capita cost from everyone’s evaluation.’ The project is undertaken whenever 
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‘An alternative procedure is to introduce the government as an artificial player whose 
expressed preferences for the project are minus its cost. If the decision is then made on the 
basis of the sign of the sum of willingnesses-to-pay, including the government’s, the project 
will be accepted only if the value exceeds the cost. Transfer payments must also be calculated 
including the government’s tatement as well, but, if the costs are assumed to be proportional 
to the number of individuals served by the project, all of the results of this paper are pre- 
served. Subtracting the per capita cost from individuals’ statements, as suggested in the text, 
leads to a system that is exactly analogous to this one as well. 
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Xi Wi 2 0, and the ith individual receives a subsidy of Cjri wj in this case. 
If the project fails, no subsidy is paid. Whatever the values for Wj, j # i, the 
ith individual cannot do better than to set wi = vi, for with this choice he will 
receive 
vi+ C wj if C wi = vi+ C wj > 0, 
j#i I j#i 
and zero otherwise. With other choices of wi, the individual runs the risk of 
either a negative payoff (if wi > vi) or a zero payoff when the truth would have 
led to a positive result (if wi < ai), and there is no potential gain. 
Since the strategy of ‘telling the truth’ is dominant for each individual, the 
Nash equilibrium in which everyone follows this policy has a strong claim on 
our attention. We want to ascertain if the costs of attaining it through the 
Groves procedure are warranted. If a project is accepted a total of Xi Xjti wj 
must be paid in subsidies. If it can be recouped through lump sum mechanisms 
so as not to distort the incentives, then the cost is purely the adverse ffect on the 
distribution of income. An upper bound on these costs can therefore be obtained 
by treating the total subsidy payment as a dead weight loss.’ 
One way of attempting to mitigate these losses is taking a random sample 
from the population to estimate tastes, and acting upon this estimate. This 
introduces the obvious trade-off - sampling error vs. the cost of the subsidies3 
This procedure does not insure that a Pareto optimum relative to the full in- 
formation situation will be found. The potential for nonoptimal decisions is one 
manifestation of the costs of the government’s imperfect information. The 
distribution of the mean preference of the sample is, of course, independent 
of the size of the population. But when an error is made, it affects all the people 
who were omitted from the sample. The risks therefore increase with the size 
of the population while the cost of the procedure grows at the rate of the square 
of the sample size. It is natural to ask how the optimal sample size depends on 
the size of the entire population and in particular to focus on the asymptotic 
2An additional problem is that, although the mechanism induces honest responses on an 
individual level, it is not immune to cooperative behavior. In fact, any two individuals can 
guarantee ach other a highly desirable outcome by both announcing a very large, fictitious, 
evaluation of the project. Furthermore, on the individual level, the incentive to reveal one’s 
true tastes decreases with the size of the population. The only instance in which the announce- 
ment affects an individual’s payoff is when it changes the sign of the aggregate. The likelihood 
of this clearly decreases as the population grows. Thus, although the incentive to tell the truth 
still exists, it is greatly weakened in large group situations. In a separate paper we take up 
the question of choosing an individually incentive compatible mechanism with desirable proper- 
ties relative to these problems as well. 
‘Related to the problems mentioned in footnote 2, this idea has some subsidiary advantages. 
Sampling may tend to make cooperative behavior more costly as members of potential coali- 
tions may have trouble seeking each other out. Moreover, by keeping the set of individuals 
smaller, the strength of the incentives to tell the truth (or the potential regret associated with 
waking an erroneous response), will increase. 
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properties of this dependence. To make this precise, we assume that the central 
planner is subjectively uncertain about the distribution of tastes in the popula- 
tion, and revises his beliefs in a Bayesian way after the sample is taken. However, 
he is bound by the rules of the Groves procedure to act in accordance with the 
sample, for otherwise its incentive compatibility would be destroyed. 
The mechanism will be informationally useful if the expected post sample sum 
of utilities exceeds the expected outcome based on the prior beliefs alone. We 
can think of the informational value of the procedure as the excess of the former 
over the latter. We study the asymptotic properties of this information value 
per capita as the size of the population grows. In cases in which this is positive 
in the limit it would be justifiable to say that the elicitation mechanism has 
made a definite contribution towards the solution of the ‘free rider’ problem, 
where, in the extreme case, the best action would be to follow prior beliefs. 
In the next section the problem is set out in the case of normally distributed 
tastes in the population and a normal prior on its unknown mean. The value of 
the Groves procedure is computed as it depends on the sample size and the 
other parameters. In section 3 we show that the optimal sample size grows not 
faster than the cube root of the population size. A more precise analytical result 
is not attainable due to inherent nonconvexities. Computational results seem to 
indicate the tightness of this upper bound. Section 4 is concerned with the excess 
of the value of this procedure, minus the necessary subsidies, over the level of 
welfare attainable by the government on the basis of its a priori beliefs alone. 
We refer to this as the informational value of the Groves mechanism. It is 
shown that this value is always nonnegative and a characterization of its 
behavior with respect to the parameters is given. A final section presents some 
computational results that tend to confirm the properties indicated above. 
2. Value of the Gloves experiment 
We consider the decision-making process concerning a potential public 
project from which exclusion will not be possible. The distribution of willingness 
to pay for the project by the members of the population can be approximated 
by a normal distribution with unknown mean m and known variance s2. The 
actual size of the population is N. Moreover, the decision-maker has a prior 
distribution on m which is a normal distribution with mean p and variance c2. 
Let k = a’/~’ be the ratio of the prior variance to the sampling variance. 
A sample of size n is drawn from the population; then, the true willingness 
to pay of agents in the sample is elicited by the Groves experiment. Let w be the 
sample mean. A Bayesian revision of the prior distribution on m leads then to 
the following posterior distlibution, 
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For each value of the sample mean w, the expected post sample utility of the 
project is 
p+tZkW 
(N-n) l+nk +nw. ( 1 
In the social evaluation of the project we assume that agents have the same 
marginal utilities of income. 
The cost of the mechanism is assumed to be the total amount of transfers 
necessary in the Groves experiment,4 
c(w, n) = n(n- 1)w. (3) 
This pessimistic evaluation of costs gives us a lower bound for the post sample 
value of the experiment when the project is performed, i.e. w > 0: 
4Actually, using c(w, n) as an upper bound on the costs of the mechanism involves a slight 
underestimate in some cases. The sum of transfers may be written 
r, c WJ, 
i j#i 
whenever & wi 2 0. In some situations, c,#i wJ may be negative for some i even though 
% w1 2 0. These individuals are taxed instead of being subsidized by the mechanism. In 
computing an upper bound on the cost these transfers impose on the system, these taxes should 
not be counted as a net benefit to the economy. To obtain a bound, we should treat taxes as a 
dead-weight loss and not count subsidies at all. Therefore, the sum of the taxes imposed on the 
sampled group is 
-Cmin(O, C wJ), 
I j#i 
while the unsampled groap must pay a tax of 
C max (0, C wJ). 
I j#i 
Therefore total taxes are 
x I c wjl, 
i j#i 
which differs from c(w, n) by 
-2: min (oyj5i wJ). 
Incorporating this modification in our analysis would greatly complicate matters. However, 
it would not change the asymptotic results in any way. Space precludes a full analysis of this 
matter in the present article. The interested reader should consult Green, Kohlberg and Laffont 
(1976) where it is shown that the expected value of the last expression, under the normality 
assumptions we have made, grows at the rate of n’lZ or less. Since c(w, n) grows like n2, this 
correction term does not have a significant influence on the asymptotic value of the proced- 
ure and does not affect the rate of growth of the optimal sample size. Small sample results 
would display slightly smaller sample sizes, but the effect is extremely small for all parameter 
values we have explored. 
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u(w, ~2, N) = 
(N-n)nk 
l+nk +2n-n 
gw+ (g&L (4) 
Letf(w) be the ex ante law of w; it is clearly a normal distribution with mean 
P and variance s2 ((l/n)+ k). Therefore, the pre-sample expected value of the 
experiment is 
(N-n)nk m 
V(n, N) = 
1 +rzk 
+2n-n2 wf(w)dw 
0 
+ (N-n) p 
s 
mf(w)dw 
l+nk o ’ 
(5) 
since the project is undertaken only if w 2 0.5 
50ne can show that this criterion is not strictly optimal in the sampling context, although 
it is the only way to produce a Pareto optimum relative to the preferences of the sample. 
Superior results could be attained by using an acceptance criterion of 
(N- n)p 
W’-Nnk+n’ 
which will result in acceptance iff the posterior evaluation of the government is nonnegative. 
In order to maintain the incentive compatibility of the mechanism, an additional subsidy of 
(N- nh 
Npk+ n 
would have to be given to each member of the sampled group in the event that the project is 
accepted. This modification would, therefore, affect the choice of the sample size. In general, 
the sample size and cutoff point would have to be jointly determined at an optimum. One can 
write down the expected value of the mechanism in this case, paralleling the method of this 
section, as a function of these two variables. It can be shown that the cutoff point converges 
to zero with the population size and that the asymptotic rate of growth of the sample size is 
unchanged. Variations in the small sample results depend on the parameters used, but the 
magnitude of the modification is very minor in all cases. Precise results are available from the 
authors on request. 
Intuitively what happens is the following: when ,u > 0, the cutoff point and subsidies increase. 
This is equivalent o an artificial stated willingness-to-pay by the government of 
W--n)@ 
W”=Nnkfn’ 
which is then counted along with all the other statements (cf. footnote 1). However, as w0 
increases from zero to the value above, subsidies rise and it can be shown that the optimal 
value of w0 is between these points. Since this involves somewhat larger subsidies than the 
mechanism we have considered, sample sizes will be smaller to economize in this dimension. 
On the other hand, when p < 0, moving towards this value of w0 improves the performance 
of the decision making mechanism as well as reducing the subsidies. The optimal statement 
by the government is therefore below this value of w ,,, and, since subsidies will be smaller on 
average, a larger sample will be used for every finite value of N. 
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The evaluation of the integrals is straightforward and leads to (see Appendix). 
with 
+Lw-n(n- 1)l P 
1 * 
P(X) = 2/C2n) 
s 
_m ew [-~~21dz. 
(6) 
A naive procedure would be to use only the prior information in deciding whether 
to do the project. This leads to an ex ante expected value of 
W(N) = Nmax [0, ~1. (7) 
The expected per capita gain of the experiment is then 
sh N) =; W, N) - max LO, ~1, (8) 
which represents the value of the information acquired per capita net of the 
costs of acquisition. 
In the next section we study the behavior of the optimal sample size n*(N) for 
large values of N. 
3. Optimal sample size 
Because of the nonconcavity of the function V(n, N), it is not possible to 
obtain analytically the optimal sample size 12*(N). However, we are able to 
bound the rate of increase of n*(N) from above and to find a lower bound for 
the value of the experiment which is shown to be a good one in the simulation 
of section 5. This is done by finding the change in the objective function with 
respect to n, and showing that it is negative in the limit if n(N) = N’ with 
6 > 3. 
Consider first the case where p = 0. The objective function is then 
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The derivative of this expression with respect o n is 
f$, N) = [& (f+k)-3’2]$ [Nk-4k2n3 
Let 
+(2k2-7k)n2+3(k-I)nf2]. 
-312 
= K; 
then 
E = lim K = IJ 
n-FCC 2k21/(2n) ’ 
If n = N’, with 6 > 0 and Ngoes to infinity, the dominant erms are KkN1-26 
among the positive ones and -4Kk’N’ among the negative ones. Since the 
positive term is of the order of Nrm2’ and the negative one of the order N’, 
we have that the derivative is negative whenever 
6>1-26 or S>+ asN-+co. 
It is easy to verify that for ~1 = 0, the objective function is quasi-concave. 
For N large but finite, an approximation of the zero of the derivative of the 
objective function is then obtained with: 
&_f-log. 
3logN 
When p # 0, the objective function is more complex. The derivative of I’(n, N) 
is then: 
Kexp [-3,u2/[(s2/n>i-cr”]]]. l/n2 
P2/S2 
> 
2 
- (N/c-kn2+[k-1]n+2) k+(l,n) + $(N--n’+n) 1 
-+A1 -2nlP > * 
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must distinguish two cases according to the sign of p. 
(a) P > 0. As N goes to infinity, the dominant terms are 
kK exp [-f(p/a)‘] N1-26 
among the positive ones, and 
[4k2E exp [-+(P/o)“] +2&~/o)] N’ 
among the negative ones. Therefore, as for p = 0, we have that the derivative 
is negative whenever 
S>+ as N-rco, 
and an approximation of the last zero of the derivative is obtained with: 
6 = *- & log [4k+4k~(211).~/o.p(~lo) exp M~b)“ll. (9) 
(b) /.L < 0. As N goes to infinity, the dominant terms are 
kR exp [--$(~/a)“] N1-26 and 2/&3(4o)N’ 
among the positive ones, and 
4k2K exp [ -$(p/~)~] N’ 
among the negative ones. Therefore if 
the result is the same as for p > 0. The relation (10) can be rewritten 
exp [--$(~/cr)~]--H “O exp [-+x2]dx > 0. 
(7 s -03 
Let y = lpi/a. Condition (11) becomes 
(10) 
(11) 
s -Y d4u) = ev [+021-v exp [--3x”] dx > 0. -cu 
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We have 
-y f)‘(y) = - s exp [ -$x’]dx < 0, -m 
and 4(O) = 1. Moreover, lim,_ m @) = 0. Therefore it is clear that 4 can have no 
zeros, since it is a decreasing function with a zero asymptote. Hence (10) is 
always satisfied. 
To sum up, for p Z 0, the derivative is negative whenever 6 > _5 when 
N -+ co. However, we do not know in this case if V(n, N) is quasi-concave; 
we know only that an upper bound of the maximum sample size is of the order 
of N113 as N -+ co. The simulation shows that the objective function is often 
quasi-concave and that (9) is a good approximation of the optimal sample size. 
4. A lower bound for the per capita gain of the Groves experiment 
According to section 3, an obvious lower bound for the per capita value of 
the Groves experiment when N -+ 00 is obtained by replacing IZ by N113 in (6): 
VW 
+kl(N+ N”3 -N2’3)~ 
or, taking the limit when N 3 co, 
lim 
N-tCC 
$ V(N”3, N 
) = “P[-t(;)yq-& +q$ (13) 
and 
hm g(N1’3, N) 
N-+OI 
= =P[-+($-j&j -p(L-qf)), 
=exp[-f(~)i]-&+pk+), 
if P < 0. 
(14) 
Let B(p, o) = lim,+, g(N 1’3, N) be this bound on the asymptotic per capita 
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gain. For p > 0, B(P, a) is 
Writing x = p/o, this is proportional to 
exp[- s] -x/:exp[-$]dz, 
which is greater than or equal to 
exp[-;I-jIzexp[-g-Jtz=O, 
since z > x throughout the range of integration. The case of p < 0 can be treated 
in a parallel manner, obtaining the same result. 
The loci of ‘B(,u, o) = constant’ can be analyzed as follows: 
Since B(p, a)/o is homogeneous in 11/o, the locus of B = 0 in the p, a-plane is 
linear. Therefore, because BG and B,, are one-signed, the locus of B = 0 must 
be the horizontal axis. Furthermore, 
Along&p, a) = constant = C/2/(2n), 
dc BP 
-= 
dp c 
-B>O, 
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d20 
d2a 
Q=- 
This gives rise to fig. 1. 
B:B,,-2B,,B,Bp,+B,2B,, 
B," 
2 exp -(p/a)’ < 0. 
1 1 
B(p,o) =const. 
/B(u.a) = o 
1’ 
Fig. 1 
Thus for every a > 0, we have a positive lower bound for the limiting per 
capita value of the optimal elicitation procedure. However, as shown by the 
simulation, for large (absolute) values of p, the mechanism may require a very 
large population to co&m this asymptotic result. When a = 0, since the prior 
has no uncertainty, the optimal sample size is clearly zero, and any utilization 
of this mechanism can only waste resources. 
5. Simulation 
The main purpose of the simulation is to check if the upper bound obtained 
for the optimal sample size and the lower bound obtained for the per capita 
gain of the Groves experiment are tight bounds which can be used as approxima- 
tions. This is necessary because of the inherent nonconvexities in the objective 
function V(n, N) (6). 
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We compute the value of V(n, N) for s = 1, CJ = 0.1, k = 0.01 and different 
values of .n and N, Then, we identify the optimal sample size and compute the 
per capita gain in information. 
Results are gathered in table 1. Fig. 2 pictures the typical evolution of the 
optimal sample size. Fig. 3 represents the per capita gain of the Groves proced- 
ure. 
f loglo n*(N) 
4 I 
Fig. 2. Optimal sample size (,u = 0), N = size of the population. 
102.g(n*,N) 
4 
Fig. 3. Per capita gain g(n*, N), p = prior mean. 
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We observe that the optimal sample size converges to CXN’/~, i.e. that the last 
zero which was approximated in the analytical derivations corresponds to the 
optimum (fig. 2). 
As expected, fig. 3 shows that the experiment is the most valuable when p is 
small in absolute value with respect to o; this corresponds to very uncertain 
prior beliefs. For large values of p, the experiment becomes valuable only for 
large populations. Note also that the per capita informational gain is almost 
symmetrical around the value of p = 0. However, to achieve the same informa- 
tional gain, the sample size is larger for negative values of ~1 than for positive 
values. Therefore, if there were a per unit sample cost, the experiment would be 
less valuable for negative than positive values of /_L Sufficiently large values of N 
are checked to verify the finding of section 4 that the asymptotic per capita 
gain is always positive when (T > 0. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to ascertain some of the performance characteristics 
of one particular mechanism for preference elicitation. Our results are largely 
favorable. They show that the essential difficulties of ‘free rider’ problem can 
be overcome even if we assume the worst of all possible circumstances in which 
the full value of the necessary transfer payments are reckoned as irretrievable 
costs. Further (though we do not explore this in detail), it is clear that the cost 
of forming and policing coalitions (if these increase with the size of the coalition) 
will, in the limit, outweigh the potential benefits as long as there is some upper 
bound on the size of the evaluation statements hat will be believed by the central 
planner. This is because the proportion of the population sampled decreases to 
zero, making it prohibitively costly for any individual to search for others in 
the sampled group with whom he can profitably collude. The characteristics of 
other individually incentive compatible and successful mechanisms in this 
regard seem worthy of further study. 
A further class of problems of relevance in a more empirical context [see Bohm 
(1972)], is how people will respond to various incentive structures when they 
have costs of accuracy in response-for example, their replies may require 
information gathering before the fate of the project is determined. In such cases 
the more sharply peaked the individual payoff functions the more accuracy will 
be induced and one must balance the need for this against he cost of production 
of potentially useless information. 
Appendix 
s m wf(w)dw = 0 
lKw~ 
J. Green and J.. J. Luflont, Preferences for public goods 
. exp - P2 
[ 0 
1 +W 
2s2 ; +k 
93 
dw 1 
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